EC News Analysis
Auto Added by WPeMatico
Inside GitLab’s IPO filing
While the technology and business world worked towards the weekend, developer operations (DevOps) firm GitLab filed to go public. Before we get into our time off, we need to pause, digest the company’s S-1 filing, and come to some early conclusions.
GitLab competes with GitHub, which Microsoft purchased for $7.5 billion back in 2018.
The company is notable for its long-held, remote-first stance, and for being more public with its metrics than most unicorns — for some time, GitLab had a November 18, 2020 IPO target in its public plans, to pick an example. We also knew when it crossed the $100 million recurring revenue threshold.
Considering GitLab’s more recent results, a narrowing operating loss in the last two quarters is good news for the company.
The company’s IPO has therefore been long expected. In its last primary transaction, GitLab raised $286 million at a post-money valuation of $2.75 billion, per Pitchbook data. The same information source also notes that GitLab executed a secondary transaction earlier this year worth $195 million, which gave the company a $6 billion valuation.
Let’s parse GitLab’s growth rate, its final pre-IPO scale, its SaaS metrics, and then ask if we think it can surpass its most recent private-market price. Sound good? Let’s rock.
The GitLab S-1
GitLab intends to list on the Nasdaq under the symbol “GTLB.” Its IPO filing lists a placeholder $100 million raise estimate, though that figure will change when the company sets an initial price range for its shares. Its fiscal year ends January 31, meaning that its quarters are offset from traditional calendar periods by a single month.
Let’s start with the big numbers.
In its fiscal year ended January 2020, GitLab posted revenues of $81.2 million, gross profit of $71.9 million, an operating loss of $128.4 million, and a modestly greater net loss of $130.7 million.
And in the year ended January 31, 2021, GitLab’s revenue rose roughly 87% to $152.2 million from a year earlier. The company’s gross profit rose around 86% to $133.7 million, and operating loss widened nearly 67% to $213.9 million. Its net loss totaled $192.2 million.
This paints a picture of a SaaS company growing quickly at scale, with essentially flat gross margins (88%). Growth has not been inexpensive either — GitLab spent more on sales and marketing than it generated in gross profit in the past two fiscal years.
Powered by WPeMatico
Ramp and Brex draw diverging market plans with M&A strategies
Earlier today, spend management startup Ramp said it has raised a $300 million Series C that valued it at $3.9 billion. It also said it was acquiring Buyer, a “negotiation-as-a-service” platform that it believes will help customers save money on purchases and SaaS products.
The round and deal were announced just a week after competitor Brex shared news of its own acquisition — the $50 million purchase of Israeli fintech startup Weav. That deal was made after Brex’s founders invested in Weav, which offers a “universal API for commerce platforms.”
From a high level, all of the recent deal-making in corporate cards and spend management shows that it’s not enough to just help companies track what employees are expensing these days. As the market matures and feature sets begin to converge, the players are seeking to differentiate themselves from the competition.
But the point of interest here is these deals can tell us where both companies think they can provide and extract the most value from the market.
These differences come atop another layer of divergence between the two companies: While Brex has instituted a paid software tier of its service, Ramp has not.
Earning more by spending less
Let’s start with Ramp. Launched in 2019, the company is a relative newcomer in the spend management category. But by all accounts, it’s producing some impressive growth numbers. As our colleague Mary Ann Azevedo wrote:
Since the beginning of 2021, the company says it has seen its number of cardholders on its platform increase by 5x, with more than 2,000 businesses currently using Ramp as their “primary spend management solution.” The transaction volume on its corporate cards has tripled since April, when its last raise was announced. And, impressively, Ramp has seen its transaction volume increase year over year by 1,000%, according to CEO and co-founder Eric Glyman.
Ramp’s focus has always been on helping its customers save money: It touts a 1.5% cash back reward for all purchases made through its cards, and says its dashboard helps businesses identify duplicitous subscriptions and license redundancies. Ramp also alerts customers when they can save money on annual versus monthly subscriptions, which it says has led many customers to do away with established T&E platforms like Concur or Expensify.
All told, the company claims that the average customer saves 3.3% per year on expenses after switching to its platform — and all that is before it brings Buyer into the fold.
Powered by WPeMatico
There could be more to the Salesforce+ video streaming service than meets the eye
When Salesforce announced its new business video streaming service called Salesforce+ this week, everyone had a reaction. While not all of it was positive, some company watchers also wondered if there was more to this announcement than meets the eye.
If you look closely, the new initiative suggests that Salesforce wants to take a bite out of LinkedIn and other SaaS content platforms and publishers. The video streaming service could be a launch point for a broader content platform, where its partners are producing their own content and using Salesforce+ infrastructure to help them advertise to and cultivate their own customers.
The video streaming service could be a launch point for a broader content platform, where its partners are producing their own content and using Salesforce+ infrastructure to help them advertise to and cultivate their own customers.
The company has, after all, done exactly this sort of thing with its online marketplaces and industry events to great success. Salesforce generated almost $6 billion in its most recent quarterly earnings report. That mostly comes from selling its sales, marketing and service software, not any kind of content production, but it has lots of experience putting on Dreamforce, its massive annual customer event, as well as smaller events throughout the year around the world.
On its face, Salesforce+ is a giant, ambitious and quite expensive content marketing play. The company reportedly has hired a large professional staff to produce and manage the content, and built a broadcasting and production studio designed to produce quality shows in-house. It believes that by launching with content from Dreamforce, its highly successful customer conference, attended by tens of thousands people every year pre-pandemic, it can prime the viewing pump and build audience momentum that way, perhaps even using celebrities as it often does at its events to drive audience. It is less clear about the long-term business goals.
Powered by WPeMatico
ServiceMax promises accelerating growth as key to $1.4B SPAC deal
ServiceMax, a company that builds software for the field-service industry, announced yesterday that it will go public via a special purpose acquisition company, or SPAC, in a deal valued at $1.4 billion. The transaction comes after ServiceMax was sold to GE for $915 million in 2016, before being spun out in late 2018. The company most recently raised $80 million from Salesforce Ventures, a key partner.
Broadly, ServiceMax’s business has a history of modest growth and cash consumption.
ServiceMax competes in the growing field-service industry primarily with ServiceNow, and interestingly enough given Salesforce Ventures’ recent investment, Salesforce Service Cloud. Other large enterprise vendors like Microsoft, SAP and Oracle also have similar products. The market looks at helping digitize traditional field service, but also touches on in-house service like IT and HR giving it a broader market in which to play.
GE originally bought the company as part of a growing industrial Internet of Things (IoT) strategy at the time, hoping to have a software service that could work hand in glove with the automated machine maintenance it was looking to implement. When that strategy failed to materialize, the company spun out ServiceMax and until now it remained part of Silver Lake Partners thanks to a deal that was finalized in 2019.
TechCrunch was curious why that was the case, so we dug into the company’s investor presentation for more hints about its financial performance. Broadly, ServiceMax’s business has a history of modest growth and cash consumption. It promises a big change to that storyline, though. Here’s how.
A look at the data
The company’s pitch to investors is that with new capital it can accelerate its growth rate and begin to generate free cash flow. To get there, the company will pursue organic (in-house) and inorganic (acquisition-based) growth. The company’s blank-check combination will provide what the company described as “$335 million of gross proceeds,” a hefty sum for the company compared to its most recent funding round.
Powered by WPeMatico
Duolingo’s S-1 depicts heady growth, monetization, new focus on English certification
Duolingo filed to go public yesterday, giving the world a deep look inside its business results and how the pandemic impacted the edtech unicorn’s performance. TechCrunch’s initial read of the company’s filing was generally positive, noting that its growth was impressive and its losses modest; Duolingo recently began making money on an adjusted basis.
While the company’s top-level numbers are impressive, we want to go one level deeper to grow our understanding of the company beyond our EC-1.
Duolingo is likely entering a period in which it will have to invest heavily in features like pronunciation, efficacy and new apps — which could come at a steep upfront cost.
First, we’ll explore the growth of Duolingo’s total user base, how much money it makes per active user, and how effectively the company has managed to convert free users to paid products over time. The numbers will set us up to understand what else can be learned about Duolingo’s business beyond our original deep dive into the company’s finances — specifically underscoring the pressure cooker it finds itself in when looking for new revenue sources.
Starting with Duolingo’s growth in total active users, guess how fast they rose from 2019 to 2020. Hold that number in your head.
The actual numbers are as follows: In 2019, Duolingo closed the year with 27.3 million monthly active users (MAUs); it wrapped 2020 with 36.7 million MAUs. That’s a gain of 34%. If we narrow our gaze to Q1 2021 numbers compared to Q1 2020, we can see that Duolingo’s MAUs rose from 33.5 million to 39.9 million, or growth of around 19%.
The bulk of Duolingo’s growth, then, came in early 2020 when we consider its pandemic bump. Put more simply, the company scaled from 27.3 million MAUs at the end of 2019 to 33.5 million MAUs at the end of Q1 2020; from then, the company added 3.2 million more MAUs throughout 2020 and 6.4 million during the next four quarters.
Another lens through which to view the numbers is simply a recognition that first-quarter results at Duolingo appear to be stronger than results in the rest of the year, perhaps due to New Year’s resolutions to learn a new language or brush up on a second language learned in high school.
Next, let’s examine Duolingo’s monetization efforts regarding converting free users to paying users.
Here we can see a very different growth story. While the company’s MAUs rose 34% from 2019 to 2020, the company’s paying users rose from 900,000 at the end of 2019 to 1.6 million at the end of 2020. That is a far sharper gain of 84% on a year-over-year basis.
So, while Duolingo did see material user growth during 2020, it saw turbocharged expansion in the users it was able to shake revenue from. Improved monetization, more than acceleration in user growth, was the pandemic’s effect on Duolingo.
What can we see in the company’s more recent results? From Q1 2020 to Q1 2021, Duolingo’s paid subscribers rose from 1.1 million to 1.8 million, a gain of around 64%. That was a slower pace than the company managed more generally in 2020, which matches Duolingo’s slower revenue growth in Q1 2021 than it recorded in 2020.
The number is still strong, we think. But not as impressive as the more than 100% revenue expansion that the company put on the board last year.
In percentage terms, 3.3% of Duolingo’s MAUs were paid subscribers in 2019. That figure rose to 4.4% in 2020. And in Q1 2021, it reached 4.5%. Duolingo rounds that number to 5% in its S-1, which feels somewhat aggressive to us, given the somewhat modest pace at which the metric is improving. Here’s the wording:
As of March 31, 2021, approximately 5% of our monthly active users were paid subscribers of Duolingo Plus. Our paid subscriber penetration has increased steadily since we launched Duolingo Plus in 2017 and, combined with our user growth, has led to our revenue more than doubling every year since.
A gain of 0.1 percentage point in a quarter is growth, we suppose.
Next, let’s chat about revenue per MAU. To get consistent numbers, we’ll divide quarterly revenues by MAU figures from the same period. So, we’ll compare Q4 2019 revenue at Duolingo with its year-end MAU figure. We’ll do the same for 2020, and for Q1 2021 we’ll use both numbers from that period.
Powered by WPeMatico
Why is Didi worth so much less than Uber?
Years ago, U.S. ride-hailing giant Uber and its Chinese rival Didi were locked in an expensive rivalry in the Asian nation. After a financially bruising competition, Uber sold its China-based business to Didi, focusing instead on other markets.
The two companies are coming head-to-head again, however, as Didi looks to list in the United States. The company’s IPO filing was big news for the SoftBank Vision Fund, Tencent and Uber, thanks to its stake in Didi from its earlier transaction.
Uber is more diversified both geographically and in terms of its revenue mix. Didi is larger, more profitable and more concentrated.
But Didi appears set to be valued at a discount to Uber. By several tens of billions of dollars, it turns out. And we can’t quite figure out why.
This week, Didi indicated that it will target a $13 to $14 per-share IPO price, with each share on the U.S. markets worth one-fourth of a Class A share in the company. In more technical language, each ADR is 25% of a Class A ordinary share in Didi, if you prefer it put like that.
With 288 million shares to be sold in its U.S. IPO, Didi could raise as much as $4.03 billion, a huge sum.
What’s Didi worth at $13 to $14 per ADR? Using a nondiluted share count, Didi is valued between $62.3 billion and $67.1 billion. Inclusive of shares that may be issued thanks to vested options and the like, Didi could be worth as much as $70 billion; Renaissance Capital calculates the company’s midpoint valuation using a fully diluted share count at $67.5 billion.
Regardless of which number you prefer, Didi is not set to challenge Uber’s own valuation. Yahoo Finance pegged Uber at $95.2 billion as of this morning.
Why is the Chinese company worth less than its erstwhile rival? Let’s dig around in their numbers and find out.
Didi versus Uber
As a reminder, Uber’s Q1 2021 included adjusted revenues of $3.5 billion, a gain of 8% compared to the year-ago quarter. Uber’s adjusted EBITDA came in for the period at -$359 million.
Powered by WPeMatico
What does Red Hat’s sale to IBM tell us about Couchbase’s valuation?
The IPO rush of 2021 continued this week with a fresh filing from NoSQL provider Couchbase. The company raised hundreds of millions while private, making its impending debut an important moment for a number of private investors, including venture capitalists.
According to PitchBook data, Couchbase was last valued at a post-money valuation of $580 million when it raised $105 million in May 2020. The company — despite its expansive fundraising history — is not a unicorn heading into its debut to the best of our knowledge.
We’d like to uncover whether it will be one when it prices and starts to trade, so we dug into Couchbase’s business model and its financial performance, hoping to better understand the company and its market comps.
The Couchbase S-1
The Couchbase S-1 filing details a company that sells database tech. More specifically, Couchbase offers customers database technology that includes what NoSQL can offer (“schema flexibility,” in the company’s phrasing), as well as the ability to ask questions of their data with SQL queries.
Couchbase’s software can be deployed on clouds, including public clouds, in hybrid environments, and even on-prem setups. The company sells to large companies, attracting 541 customers by the end of its fiscal 2021 that generated $107.8 million in annual recurring revenue, or ARR, by the close of last year.
Couchbase breaks its revenue into two main buckets. The first, subscription, includes software license income and what the company calls “support and other” revenues, which it defines as “post-contract support,” or PCS, which is a package of offerings, including “support, bug fixes and the right to receive unspecified software updates and upgrades” for the length of the contract.
The company’s second revenue bucket is services, which is self-explanatory and lower-margin than its subscription products.
Powered by WPeMatico
Despite flat growth, ride-hailing colossus Didi’s US IPO could reach $70B
Didi filed to go public in the United States last night, providing a look into the Chinese ride-hailing company’s business. This morning, we’re extending our earlier reporting on the company to dive into its numerical performance, economic health and possible valuation.
Recall that Didi has raised tens of billions worth of private capital from venture capitalists, private equity firms, corporations and other sources. The size of the bet riding on Didi is simply massive.
Didi is approaching the American public markets at a fortuitous moment. While the late-2020 IPO fervor, which sent offerings from DoorDash and others skyrocketing after their debuts, has cooled, valuations for public companies remain high compared to historical norms. And Uber and Lyft, two American ride-hailing companies, have been posting numbers that point to at least a modest recovery in the ride-hailing industry as COVID-19 abates in many parts of the world.
As further grounding, recall that Didi has raised tens of billions worth of private capital from venture capitalists, private equity firms, corporations and other sources. The size of the bet riding on Didi is simply massive. As we explore the company’s finances, then, we’re more than vetting a single company’s performance; we’re examining what sort of returns an ocean of capital may be able to derive from its exit.
In that vein, we’ll consider GMV results, revenue growth, historical profitability, present-day profitability and what Didi may be worth on the American markets, given current comps. Sound good? Into the breach!
Inside Didi’s IPO filing
Starting at the highest level, how quickly has gross transaction volume (GTV) scaled at the company?
GTV
Didi is historically a business that operates in China but has operations today in more than a dozen countries. The impact and recovery of China’s bout with COVID-19 is therefore not the whole picture of the company’s GTV results.
COVID-19 began to affect the company starting in the first quarter of 2020. From the Didi F-1 filing:
Core Platform GTV fell by 32.8% in the first quarter of 2020 as compared to the first quarter of 2019, and then by 16.0% in the second quarter of 2020 as compared to the second quarter of 2019.
The dips were short-lived, however, with Didi quickly returning to growth in the second half of the year:
Our businesses resumed growth in the second half of 2020, which moderated the impact on a year-on-year basis. Our Core Platform GTV for the full year 2020 decreased by 4.8% as compared to the full year 2019. Both our China Mobility and International segments were impacted, but whereas the GTV for our China Mobility segment decreased by 6.6% from 2019 to 2020, the GTV for our International segment increased by 11.4% from 2019 to 2020.
Holding to just the Chinese market, we can see how rapidly Didi managed to pick itself up over the last year. Chinese GTV at Didi grew from 25.7 billion RMB to 54.6 billion RMB from the first quarter of 2020 to the first quarter of 2021; naturally, we’re comparing a more pandemic-impacted quarter at the company to a less-affected period, but the comparison is still useful for showing how the company recovered from early-2020 lows.
The number of transactions that Didi recorded in China during the first quarter of this year was also up more than 2x year over year.
On a whole-company basis, Didi’s “core platform GTV,” or the “sum of GTV for our China Mobility and International segments,” posted numbers that are less impressive in growth terms:
Image Credits: Didi F-1 filing
You can see how quickly and painfully COVID-19 blunted Didi’s global operations. But seeing the company settle back to late-2019 GTV numbers in 2021 is not super bullish.
Takeaway: While Didi managed an impressive GTV recovery in China, its aggregate numbers are flatter, and recent quarterly trends are not incredibly attractive.
Revenue growth
Powered by WPeMatico
Xometry is taking its excess manufacturing capacity business public
Xometry, a Maryland-based service that connects companies with manufacturers with excess production capacity around the world, filed an S-1 form with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission announcing its intent to become a public company.
Growth aside, it’s clear that Xometry is no modern software business, at least from a revenue-quality profile.
As the global supply chain tightened during the pandemic in 2020, a company that helped find excess manufacturing capacity was likely in high demand. CEO and co-founder Randy Altschuler described his company to TechCrunch this way last September upon the announcement of a $75 million Series E investment:
“We’ve created a marketplace using artificial intelligence to power it, and provide an e-commerce experience for buyers of custom manufacturing and for suppliers to deliver that manufacturing,” Altschuler said at the time. Xometry raised nearly $200 million while private, per Crunchbase data.
With Xometry, companies looking to build custom parts now have the ability to do so in a digital way. Rather than working the phones or starting an email chain, they can go into the Xometery marketplace, define parameters for their project and find a qualified manufacturer who can handle the job at the best price.
As of last September, the company had built relationships with 5,000 manufacturers around the world and had 30,000 customers using the platform.
At the time of that funding round, perhaps it wasn’t a coincidence that the company’s lead investor was T. Rowe Price. When an institutional investor is involved in a late-stage round, it’s usually a sign that the company is ready to start thinking about an IPO. Altschuler said it was definitely something the company was considering and had brought on a CFO, too, another sign that a company is ready to take that next step.
So what do Xometry’s financials look like as it heads to the public markets? We took a look at the S-1 to find out.
The numbers
Xometry makes money in two ways. The first comes from one part of its marketplace, with the company generating “substantially all of [its] revenue” from charging “buyers on its platform.” The other way that Xometry engenders top line is seller-related services, including financial work. The company notes that seller-generated revenues were just 5% of its 2020 total, though it does expect that figure to rise.
Powered by WPeMatico
The existential cost of decelerated growth
What happens to technology companies with slowing growth and a rising focus on profitability before they reach behemoth scale? How much does the market value hypergrowth?
Just because a technology startup has a hot start, that doesn’t mean it will grow quickly forever. Most will wind up somewhere in the middle — or worse. Put simply, there is a larger number of tech companies that do fine or a little bit worse after they reach scale.
The Exchange explores startups, markets and money.
Read it every morning on Extra Crunch or get The Exchange newsletter every Saturday.
But what every investor hopes for is the hot company that can keep growth alive even after reaching material scale, running through walls, competitors, economic headwinds and anything else that comes its way. Those companies don’t end up worth a few hundred million, or a billion, but can end up valued in the dozens of billions or more.
In reverse, tech companies — even those with strong gross margins — with slipping growth can see their multiples compress rapidly. Then, the vultures circle.
Which explains some of the news we’ve seen recently in the market. As Dropbox comes under fresh pressure from external parties, joining its erstwhile rival Box in the public-market growth penalty box, we’re seeing companies like Braze, Gong, Shippo and others rip ahead with rapid-fire funding rounds or public brags about their growth.
While the differential between the two groups is clear, it’s still worth exploring in more detail. Let’s talk about the growth dividend. Or, if you’d prefer, the existential cost of growth deceleration.
Grow or die
The news this week that Dropbox has attracted an activist shareholder should not have been a surprise. Its former rival Box is in the midst of a long-running struggle with an activist investor of its own. (More here.)
Powered by WPeMatico